We study the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel where a transmitter wishes to communicate a secure message to a legitimate receiver in the presence of eavesdroppers, while the eavesdroppers should not be able to decode the secure message. Each node in the network is equipped with arbitrary number of antennas. Furthermore, channels are time varying, and the transmitter has no channel state information (CSIT) of its channels to the eavesdroppers; and it only has access to delayed CSIT of the channel to the legitimate receiver. We completely characterize the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) of such network, when restricted to linear encoding schemes. In particular, we strictly improve the state-of-the-art achievable schemes for this network. Furthermore, we develop a tight converse result by presenting a lemma, which states that once the transmitter(s) in a network have no CSIT of a certain receiver, and receivers have the same number of antennas, the least amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, meaning that transmit signals will occupy the maximal signal dimensions at that receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wiretap channel is one of the canonical settings in the information-theoretic study of secrecy in wireless networks. It consists of a transmitter that wishes to communicate a secret message to a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper that should not decode the secure message. There has been a large amount of work on this problem, and its secrecy capacity has been determined in several configurations (e.g., [1] - [4] ). In particular, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel is characterized in [4] , and it is known that if the channel to the legitimate receiver is "less noisy" than the channel to the eavesdropper, then a positive rate of secret communication is achievable.
However, the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel does not scale with the available transmit power, i.e., the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) of Gaussian wiretap channel is zero. This has motivated the utilization of helping jammers and multi-antenna transmitters in the network to increase the achievable SDoF (e.g. [5] - [15] ). In particular, it has been shown in [8] that the SDoF of wiretap channel with a helping jammer (i.e. cooperative jamming) in a wireless setting in which the channels remain constant is 1 2 . This work has also been extended in [9] to the case that transmitters have no knowledge of channels to the eavesdropper (i.e., blind cooperative jamming), and it has been shown that even if transmitters have no eavesdropper CSIT, the same SDoF can be achieved. However, these results rely on the assumption that channels are constant, and do not change over time.
The case of time-varying channels (i.e. ergodic channels) has also been considered in some prior works in the literature. In particular, in [16] Yang et. al. have considered the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT; and they have characterized the SDoF of such network for arbitrary number of antennas. However, they assume that the transmitter has access to perfect delayed CSIT of the eavesdropper, which in many scenarios is not a realistic assumption. For the case where no eavesdropper CSIT is available, [16] only provides some inner bounds on the SDoF.
In this work, we focus on the time-varying wiretap channel in which channels are changing over time; and we consider arbitrary number of eavesdroppers in the network. The transmitter is blind with respect to the state of channels to the eavesdroppers, and only has access to delayed channel state information (CSIT) of the legitimate receiver. We consider the case where all nodes in the network are equipped with arbitrary number of antennas, which is referred to as "blind MIMO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT".
We completely characterize the SDoF of such network, when restricted to linear encoding schemes. In particular, we improve the state-of-the-art achievable schemes in [16] . In our achievable scheme transmitters cooperatively transmit artificial noise to perform two tasks: first, the artificial noise signals are aligned at the legitimate receiver in order to provide some room for the secure message to be decoded. Second, the artificial noise signals span the entire received signal space at the eavesdroppers to completely drown the secure message at the eavesdroppers.
The converse is based on a key lemma, called Least Alignment Lemma. It states that once the transmitter(s) in a network have no CSIT of a certain receiver, and receivers have the same number of antennas, the least amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, meaning that transmit signals will occupy the maximal signal dimensions at that receiver.
As a special case, the converse result implies that the achievable scheme presented in [17] for blind MISO wiretap channel with delayed CSIT, which achieves 1 2 , is indeed optimal when restricted to linear coding schemes.
Other Related Works: Artificial Noise Alignment was introduced in [7] to drown the secure message in the artificial noise at the undesired receivers. Khisti in [15] has studied interference alignment for the multiantenna compound wiretap channel. On the other hand, Shamai et. al. have studied secrecy degrees of freedom of the multi-antenna block fading wiretap channels [18] . In [8] Xie and Ulukus have studied the SDoF of four fundamental one-hop wireless networks: Gaussian wiretap channel, Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages, Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, and Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel. They assume constant channel gains, and provide achievability results based on Real Interference Alignment.
II. SYSTEM MODEL & MAIN RESULTS
We consider the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channel depicted in Fig. 1 , which consists of a transmitter (Tx) and k + 1 receivers, where Tx has a secret message for Rx 1 (legitimate receiver); and Rx 2 , . . . , Rx k+1 are eavesdroppers. Tx is equipped with M antennas, and for each j, j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}, Rx j has N j antennas. The received signal at Rx j (j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}) at time t is
where x(t) ∈ C M is the transmit signal vector of Tx; g j (t) ∈ C Nj ×M indicates the channel matrix from Tx to Rx j ; and z j (t) ∼ CN (0, I Nj ). The channel coefficients comprising the channel matrix g j (t) are i.i.d, and also i.i.d. across time and different receivers, and they are drawn from a continuous distribution. 1 We denote by G(t) the set of all channel coefficients at time t. In addition, we denote by G n the set of all channel coefficients from time 1 to n, i.e.,
Denoting the vector of transmit signals for Tx in a block of length n by x n , Tx obeys an average power constraint, 1 n E{|| x n || 2 } ≤ P . We assume delayed channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT) with respect to the channel to the legitimate receiver (Rx 1 ); however, the transmitter has no knowledge of channels to the eavesdroppers. In other words, at time t, only the states of the past G t−1 0 {g 1 (h) : h = 1, . . . , t − 1} are known to the transmitter.
We restrict ourselves to linear coding strategies as defined in [19] - [21] . In particular, we consider a communication scheme with block length n, in which Tx wishes to communicate a vector x ∈ C m1(n) of m 1 (n) ∈ N information symbols to Rx 1 . The information symbols are then modulated at time t, t = 1, . . . , n, with precoding matrix v(t) ∈ C M×m1(n) . Each information symbol is a Gaussian random variable with variance P . In addition, Tx can use a vector w ∈ C m2(n) of m 2 (n) ∈ N noise symbols, modulated with precoding matrix u(t) ∈ C M ×m2(n) at time t = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note that the precoding matrices v(t), u(t) depend only upon the outcome of G t−1 0 due to the delayed channel knowledge constraint:
Based on this linear precoding, Tx will then send x(t) = v(t) x + u(t) w at time t. We denote the precoding function used by Tx by
In addition, we denote by V n ∈ C nM ×m1(n) , and U n ∈ C nM ×m2(n) the overall precoding matrices such that v(t) occupies the rows 1 + (t − 1)M, . . . , tM of V n , and u(t) occupies the rows 1 + (t − 1)M, . . . , tM of U n . Moreover, we denote by G n j ∈ C nNj ×nM the block diagonal channel coefficients matrix where the channel coefficients of timeslot t are in the rows 1 + (t − 1)N j , . . . , tN j , and in the columns 1 + (t − 1)M, . . . , tM .
Based on the above setting, the received signal at Rx j (j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1}) after the n time steps of communication is
Now, consider decoding x at Rx j for j = 1, . . . , k+1.
The interference subspace due to U n at Rx j will be
where colspan(A) is the subspace spanned by columns of matrix A . Throughout the paper we denote by [A B] the horizontal concatenation of two matrices A, B. Let I c j ⊆ C nNj denote the orthogonal subspace of I j .
Then, in the regime of asymptotically high transmit powers (i.e., ignoring the noise), the decodability condition for information symbols of Tx at Rx 1 corresponds to the constraint that the image of colspan(G n 1 V n ) on I c 1 has dimension m 1 (n):
where Proj I c 1 colspan (G n 1 V n ) is the orthogonal projection of column span of G n 1 V n on I c 1 . Note that in general, one can show by using simple linear algebra that for two matrices A, B of the same row size,
Therefore, we can rewrite the decodability condition in (5) as
Definition 1. d secure degrees of freedom are linearly achievable if there exists a sequence {f (n) } ∞ n=1 such that for each n, V n satisfies the decodability condition of (5) with probability 1, and
and (Equivocation Condition):
Linear secure degrees of freedom (LSDoF) is defined as the supremum of all linearly achievable d's.
Note that by using (6) the Equivocation condition in (9) can be rewritten as following (2 ≤ j ≤ k + 1): 
Remark 1. For the first two cases in Theorem 1 the LSDoF was previously achieved in [16] ; and the main contribution there is the converse proof for the second case (i.e. N max ≤ N 1 < M ). Nevertheless, for the third and fourth cases both the achievability and converse are the contributions of this work. In particular, the achievable schemes for N 1 ≤ N max < M < N 1 +N max and N 1 ≤ N max , M ≥ N 1 +N max outperform the state-of-the-art schemes in [16] ; furthermore, Theorem 1 states that our schemes are optimal, and therefore characterizes the LSDoF for all antenna configurations.
III. PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY FOR THEOREM 1
We present the achievable scheme for a representative case (i.e. case of N 1 ≤ N max < M < N 1 + N max ). The rest of the cases can be achieved using similar schemes, and are provided in [22] . We denote by Rx max the eavesdropper with N max antennas. Our scheme secretly delivers N 1 (M −N max ) information symbols over M + N 1 − N max timeslots in 2 phases.
Phase 1: For t = 1, . . . , N 1 , each antenna sends a distinct new noise symbol. Hence, what Rx 1 receives on its first (M −N max ) antennas in each timeslot are linearly independent noise equations that are almost surely not known by Rx max (and similarly, almost surely not recoverable by other eavesdroppers either). Hence, by the end of Phase 1, Rx 1 obtains N 1 (M − N max ) linearly independent noise equations that are not known by any of the eavesdroppers almost surely.
Phase 2: In each of the timeslots t ∈ {N 1 + 1, . . . , M + N 1 − N max }, only N 1 transmit antennas are active, each sending a linearly independent noise equation already known by Rx 1 (which is not recoverable by other receivers) plus a distinct information symbol. In each timeslot of Phase 2, Rx 1 cancels the noise equations that are being sent from its received signal, and recovers N 1 information symbols. Therefore, Rx 1 recovers N 1 (M − N max ) information symbols in total. On the other hand, the Equivocation condition in (10) for Rx max is satisfied since for
Similarly, one can argue that the Equivocation condition (10) holds for other eavesdroppers with less number of antennas as well. Hence, overall N 1 (M − N max ) information symbols are delivered securely to Rx 1 over M + N 1 − N max timeslots.
The scheme for a simple configuration of this case (M = 4, N 1 = 2, N max = 3), which outperforms the state-of-the-art [16] , is presented in Fig. 2 .
IV. PROOF OF CONVERSE FOR THEOREM 1
In this section we present the converse proof for the same representative case as in the previous Section (i.e. the case of N 1 ≤ N max < M < N 1 + N max ). The rest of the cases can be proved using similar techniques, and are provided in [22] .
Note that for any antenna configuration (M, N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N k+1 ), if some of the eavesdroppers are removed from the network, LSDoF will not decrease; and this is due to dropping some of the constraints on maximizing the secure rate. Hence, to prove the converse we first remove all the eavesdroppers except Rx max from the network.
The main ingredient of the converse is the following lemma, which captures the impact of asymmetric CSIT in the network, and is proven in Appendix A. for any receiver Rx 0 with N 1 antennas, for which Tx has no CSIT, rank
. Remark 2. Lemma 1 implies that when using linear schemes and considering receivers with same number of antennas, once the transmitter(s) in the network have no CSIT with respect to a certain receiver, the least amount of alignment will occur at that receiver, i.e., transmit signals will occupy the maximal signal dimensions at that receiver. Lemma 1 is the extension of Lemma 2 in [23] to the multi-antenna case.
Suppose d linear secure DoF can be achieved, i.e., there exists a sequence {f (n) } ∞ n=1 resulting in satisfying (7) , (9) with probability 1, and d = lim n→∞ m1(n) n . Hence, for each n, by the decodability condition in (7) we have
a.s.
= m1(n). (11) Furthermore, we define
Therefore, by Equivocation condition in (10), lim n→∞ eaves(n) n a.s.
The following lemma bounds the maximum ratio of received signal dimensions at two receivers. It is different from the Rank Ratio Inequality (RRI) in [20] in that it considers only one multi-antenna transmitter in the network, while in [20] The proof for Lemma 2 follows from channel symmetry; in particular, it follows the same steps as the proof of Lemma 1 in [16] ; and therefore, it has been omitted for brevity.
We will now use the above derivations to prove the converse for the case of N 1 ≤ N max < M < N 1 + N max . Let us first partition the rows of G n max to two sets of rows G n max,1 , G n max,2 , where G n max,1 comprises rows which contain the channel coefficients from the transmitter to the first N 1 antennas of Rx max , and G n max,2 corresponds to rows which contain the channel coefficients from the transmitter to the remaining N max − N 1 antennas of Rx max . In addition, we denote by G n max,3 the channel to a virtual receiver with M −N max antennas from which the transmitter has no CSIT.
Moreover, we partition G n 1 to two sets of rows G n 1,1 , G n 1,2 , where G n 1,1 comprises rows which contain the channel coefficients of the first M − N max antennas of Rx 1 , and G n 1,2 corresponds to rows which contain the channel coefficients from the transmitter to the remaining N 1 + N max − M antennas of Rx 1 .
Before going to the proof of converse, we first present a claim which is going to be used in the proof. The proof of the following claim can be found in [22] .
− rank G n max,1 [V n U n ] ).
We now prove the converse.
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Remark 3. Using the same line of argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, one can prove Lemma 1 in a more general network setting where there are arbitrary number of transmitters, and the transmitters have arbitrary number of antennas. In addition, the assumption of delayed CSIT of channels to Rx 1 can be relaxed to any form of CSIT of channels to Rx 1 (e.g. instantaneous CSIT, or partial delayed CSIT).
